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RESPONSES
TO PERFORM OR PAY DAMAGES
Gregory Klass*

I

N The Myth of Efficient Breach, Daniel Markovits and Alan
Schwartz deploy an original mix of instrumentalist, interpretive,
and moral arguments.1 The instrumentalist arguments start from
the premise that parties use contract law as a tool to maximize
their individual gains from exchange, and then ask how it should be
designed to best serve that purpose. Markovits and Schwartz’s
most significant points here are the distributive equivalence of expectation damages and specific performance and their argument
for the expectation remedy. The distributive equivalence thesis
holds that in a competitive market with enough sophisticated parties, anything a non-breaching party loses under the expectation
remedy (or any other damage measure) she has already gained
back in a lower price or other favorable terms.2 The argument for
expectation damages rather than specific performance rests on the
familiar claim that the expectation remedy achieves efficient performance decisions with lower transaction costs than does specific
performance.3 Expectation damages therefore provide greater net
*

John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center.
Daniel Markovits & Alan Schwartz, The Myth of Efficient Breach: New Defenses
of the Expectation Interest, 97 Va. L. Rev. 1939 (2011).
2
Markovits and Schwartz’s distributive claim, while not novel, is arguably underappreciated in the literature. See Richard Craswell, Promises and Prices, 45
Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 16–20, available at
http://www.law.stanford.edu/display/images/dynamic/events_media/Craswell%20Promises
%20and%20Prices.pdf); Alan Schwartz, The Myth that Promisees Prefer Supracomensatory Remedies: An Analysis of Contracting for Damage Measures, 100 Yale L.J. 369,
373–76 (1990).
3
While this thesis is common wisdom among economic thinking contracts scholars,
Markovits and Schwartz add something new to the legal literature. In addition to the
familiar claim that specific performance imposes higher ex post renegotiation costs
because the parties are in a bilateral monopoly, they argue that it causes higher ex
ante costs in reaching a deal because it requires considering more possible ex post
states of the world and entails a more complex pricing formula. Markovits &
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1966–69.
1
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gains of trade, from which it follows that a party stands to benefit
more from the ex ante reduction in price with expectation damages
than from the chance of extracting more ex post with specific performance. Markovits and Schwartz’s interpretive claim, which
builds on their instrumental arguments, is their so-called dualperformance hypothesis: contracts between sophisticated parties
are best interpreted as imposing an obligation to perform or pay
damages, rather than simply an obligation to perform. Finally,
Markovits and Schwartz make two big moral claims. They defend
expectation damages against critics who argue that the remedy is at
odds with parties’ moral obligations. The dual-performance hypothesis shows that expectation damages are in fact a form of specific performance, which is just what the moral critics say the law
should provide. And Markovits and Schwartz advance the affirmative claim that not only are expectation damages compatible with
morality, but also a commitment to perform or pay damages enables arms-length respectful relationships that have a moral value
all their own. In this Response, I venture a few thoughts about the
dual-performance hypothesis and on Markovits and Schwartz’s answer to the moral critics.
The dual-performance hypothesis “holds that contracts typically
impose alternative obligations on the promisor: either to supply
goods or services for a specified price or to transfer to the promisee
the gain the promisee would have made had those goods or services been supplied.”4 In other words, although most contractual
agreements are expressed in sentences of the form
“A shall x,”
where A is a party and x is some act or forbearance, what they actually say is that
“A shall x or y,”
where x, the “action term,” is some act or forbearance and y, the
“transfer term,” is a payment sufficient to put the other party in the
position she would have occupied had A xed. Philosophers will
recognize this form of argument. A good deal of twentieth-century
analytic philosophy attempted to solve, or dissolve, apparently sub4

Id. at 1948 (emphasis omitted).
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stantive theoretical puzzles by showing that they rested on mistakes of meaning.5 As Ludwig Wittgenstein put the idea in a different context: “A picture held us captive. And we could not get outside it, for it lay in our language and language seemed to repeat it
to us inexorably.”6 These sentences, I think, express Markovits and
Schwartz’s attitude toward familiar moral criticisms of the expectation remedy and the theory of efficient breach. The moral critics
have been held captive by a false picture of the content of contractual promises.
If Markovits and Schwartz’s moral argument is to succeed, the
dual-performance hypothesis must be an empirical interpretive
claim. Parties, or at least sophisticated parties, must in fact understand their contracts to commit them not to perform the action
term simpliciter, but to perform the action or the transfer term.
[I]f promisee sophistication is assumed, the transfer term arises
out of the parties’ actual intentions and not just out of intentions
that it would be rational for them to have or fair to impute to
them. The transfer promise . . . is as real, as much a product of
the parties’ actual intentions, as the promises that constitute the
7
action and price terms.

Dual-performance is not a mere theoretical construct. The transfer
term is implied in fact by the price and other terms of the parties’
contract.8
The argument for this empirical interpretive claim builds on
Markovits and Schwartz’s instrumentalist theses. The distributive
equivalence thesis starts from the insight that, assuming sophisticated parties in a competitive market, expectation damages result
in a lower price or other more favorable terms, as they permit each
side to avoid performance for a price. In a contract between A and
5

The most famous example is Bertrand Russell’s suggestion that the sentence “The
present King of France is bald” is best understood as saying that there exists a person
who both is the King of France and is bald. This allowed Russell to explain, for example, how the sentence could be false, though one of its negations (“The present King
of France is not bald”) is also false. Bertrand Russell, On Denoting, 14 Mind 479, 490
(1905).
6
Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations 48–49 (G. E. M. Anscombe
trans., 1953).
7
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1978.
8
Id.
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B, therefore, what B loses after A’s breach under the expectation
remedy as compared to specific performance, B gains at the time of
contracting in better terms. Expectation damages and specific performance are distributively equivalent. If transaction costs are
lower with expectation damages than with specific performance,
then at the time of contracting, B stands to gain more from the reduction in price she gets with expectation damages than she would
from specific performance and the chance to renegotiate should A
later want to avoid her contractual obligations. The parties therefore prefer the expectation remedy.9 Now here is the move to the
dual-performance hypothesis: because B is a sophisticated party,
she knows that the lower price or other favorable terms she gets
under the expectation remedy are premised on the fact that, should
performance become inefficient, A will choose to pay rather than
perform. That is, B expects A to treat her contractual commitment
as no more than a commitment to perform or pay damages. In fact,
she wants A to treat it that way, for only if A does so can B get the
advantage of the better terms, reduced transaction costs and
greater gains of trade. From both parties’ perspectives, then, A
commits herself not simply to perform, but to perform or pay damages, or more perspicuously, A commits herself to perform either
an action term or a transfer term.
Like Seana Shiffrin, I have my doubts about the success of this
attempt to derive an “is” from an “ought.”10 For one thing, it is not
obvious that even sophisticated parties always recognize what
terms are in their risk-adjusted individual interests. The last thirty
years have seen an explosion of work in cognitive psychology and
behavioral economics, not to mention the recent global financial
meltdown, all of which call that assumption into question. We can9

Markovits and Schwartz do not fully explain why the law should set the default
remedy to accord with the preferences of sophisticated parties rather than those who
are less familiar with the law. Because sophisticated parties are more likely to know
the legal default, they are more likely to opt out if it is not the term they want. Setting
the default at specific performance would force sophisticated parties to reveal their
preferences for expectation damages when they contract with non-sophisticated parties, thereby serving an educative function. In short, Markovits and Schwartz do not
explain why the law should use a majoritarian rather than an information-forcing default. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An
Economic Theory of Default Rules, 99 Yale L.J. 87, 97–98 (1989).
10
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, Must I Mean What You Think I Should Have Said?, 98
Va. L. Rev. 159, 163 (2012).
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not move so quickly from the fact that rationally self-interested
parties should prefer dual-performance commitments to the conclusion that sophisticated parties do prefer them. Moreover, even if
sophisticated parties want commitments of the form “A shall x or
y,” it does not follow that this is what they think they are getting
when they write a contract that says only “A shall x.” Sophisticated
parties know how to write take-or-pay or alternative-performance
contracts when they want them, and in many industries they commonly do so. Markovits and Schwartz do not explain why parties
choose to express their contracts using language that does not correspond to their understanding of the commitment. One wants
some empirical evidence for Markovits and Schwartz’s empirical
interpretive claim. Markovits and Schwartz are correct to observe
that “principles of fidelity are not principles of interpretation.”11
Nor, however, are analytic truths about economic models interpretations of what people in the world outside those models intend or
say.12
Still, I like the dual-performance hypothesis. Whether the claim
is descriptively accurate or not, it casts new light on the theory of
efficient breach. Having argued that contracts typically involve disjunctive commitments—a commitment to satisfy the action term or
the transfer term—Markovits and Schwartz can quickly conclude
that “the expectation remedy is specific performance.”13 The monetary award enjoins a breaching party to perform the transfer term.
This suggests two surprising implications of the efficient breach
theory.
First, Markovits and Schwartz’s claim that expectation damages
specifically enforce the disjunctive commitment raises an obvious
11
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1987; see also Richard Craswell, Contract
Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy of Promising, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 489, 490
(1989).
12
In the Introduction, Markovits and Schwartz say that their arguments “are principally formal or analytic,” but that they “answer the current criticisms of the expectation remedy because the criticisms themselves are largely formal and analytic.”
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1954. I am not sure how to reconcile these
statements with their subsequent claims that the dual-performance hypothesis describes sophisticated parties’ actual intentions. Moreover, while moral criticisms of
the expectation remedy often involve underdeveloped interpretive claims, those
claims are not analytic in the sense Markovits and Schwartz use the term. They are
not internal to an economic model of arms-length transactions.
13
Id. at 1987.
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question: why should courts enjoin the transfer term rather than
the action term? Specific performance of the action term, together
with the ability to avoid the injunction by performing the transfer,
would give parties the same incentives expectation damages do.
Faced with the prospect of court-compelled performance of the action term, a party would choose to transfer if and only if the costs
of performing (or being ordered to perform) the action term exceeded the other side’s expected value from that performance.
If there is an instrumentalist answer, it involves transaction costs
and investment incentives. Perhaps it is cheaper for courts to enforce the payment of money than to enjoin other acts or forbearances. And if the parties do not specify a dollar amount in advance,
they might worry that they will need a court to sort out the exit
price in any case. Such explanations, however, come from outside
the model. If, for example, the parties can build the expectation
remedy into the price, surely they can agree on a risk-adjusted exit
price that would protect a party’s expectation interest. So here is a
first surprising result: the model that supports expectation damages
equally supports specific performance of the action term together
with an option to avoid performance for a price.
The above point is not meant as a criticism. Markovits and
Schwartz are not attempting an a priori argument that expectation
damages beat all comers, but a defense of expectation damages
against critics who say that specific performance better reflects the
parties’ moral obligations. Still, taking the dual-performance hypothesis seriously tells us something about the theory of efficient
breach. In that theory’s nearly frictionless world, the parties might
instead choose specific performance plus an option to buy one’s
way out of the duty to perform.
A second implication of the dual-performance hypothesis is a bit
more at odds with what Markovits and Schwartz say. As Markovits
and Schwartz observe, if you believe the dual-performance hypothesis, the entitlement to performance is protected not by a liability rule but rather by a property rule.14 A party cannot avoid
her obligation to perform the action or transfer term without first
obtaining the other side’s consent. The standard theory of property
and liability rules explains why this should be so. Property rules are
14

Id. at 1988–89.
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appropriate when lawmakers can identify socially undesirable behavior with a high degree of certainty, though they find it difficult
to quantify its costs.15 This describes breach of a dual-performance
commitment. Because the transfer term requires only the payment
of money, it is purely redistributive. In the model, money has the
same value in anyone’s hands, and so transfers of it do not create
new value. But the redistribution is not costless. The failure to pay
the transfer term undermines trust in future commitments. Markovits and Schwartz can therefore conclude that “no true breach is
efficient.”16 Breach of the obligation to act or transfer should not be
priced, but prohibited.
But then why specific performance? There are property rules
and then there are property rules. While injunctive relief is commonly classified as a form of property-rule protection, the incentives it provides are very different from those created by punitive
damages or criminal sanctions. True penalties deter nonconsensual
takings tout court. Steal a loaf of bread and you land in jail. Commit civil fraud and you risk a punitive award that exceeds your expected profit. Injunctive relief, in contrast, does not penalize the
initial nonconsensual taking. Instead, an injunction clarifies what
the entitlement is and establishes that any future nonconsensual
taking of it will be penalized by civil or criminal contempt. Why
should contract law give the promisor who has refused to act or
transfer a do-over? The theory supports awarding punitive damages to the promisee who has been forced to go to court to vindicate her entitlement to performance of the disjunctive obligation.
This result dovetails with a hypothesis I have developed elsewhere: that in many transactions, parties might reasonably want a
rule that would apply extracompensatory remedies to a breaching
party’s failure to cooperate in the recovery of damages.17 It also
corresponds to the letter of California’s brief experiment with punitive damages for bad faith breach. In Seaman’s Direct Buying
Service v. Standard Oil Co., the California Supreme Court held that
punitive damages are appropriate when a party, “in addition to
breaching the contract, . . . seeks to shield itself from liability by
15

See Robert Cooter, Prices and Sanctions, 84 Colum. L. Rev. 1523, 1524–25 (1984).
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1949.
17
Gregory Klass, Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, 117 Yale L.J. 2, 54–60
(2007).
16
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denying, in bad faith and without probable cause, that the contract
exists.”18 The same logic explains the treble damages and per-claim
penalties that the False Claims Act imposes against government
contractors who lie about performance,19 as well as judicial readings
of the statute as imposing on government contractors an affirmative duty to disclose any material breaches.20 And we can make
sense of the result on the traditional account of efficient breach.
Efficient breach takes as a premise that recovering damages is relatively cheap. Recovery is cheap when the breaching party willingly
pays, or at least does not actively obstruct, recovery. While the efficient breach theory recommends pricing a party’s first-order entitlement to performance, it supports protecting the non-breaching
party’s second-order entitlement to that price with a property rule
like punitive damages.21
Markovits and Schwartz recognize this potential implication:
[I]f punitive damages for gross breach of contract have had a
short career in American law, this is not because of any principled tension between their moralizing nature and the normative
structure of the expectation remedy. Rather, courts are reluctant
to award punitive damages for breach of contract because of
pragmatic difficulties that are internal to the effective articula22
tion and administration of a punitive damages regime itself.

But Markovits and Schwartz’s explanation of those “pragmatic difficulties” is incomplete. They argue that courts might find it “difficult to distinguish gross breaches of contract (for example, bad
faith breaches) from breaches that violate only the contract it-

18
686 P.2d 1158, 1167 (Cal. 1984). I describe the Seaman’s rule in more detail, and
defend it against its critics, in Contracting for Cooperation in Recovery, supra note 17,
at 38–41.
19
31 U.S.C. § 3729 (2006).
20
Michael Holt and I analyze these developments in Implied Certification Under the
False Claims Act, 41 Pub. Cont. L.J. 1 (2011). Three important decisions in this line of
cases are United States v. Science Applications International Corp., 626 F.3d 1257, 1269
(D.C. Cir. 2010), Mikes v. Straus, 274 F.3d 687, 702 (2d Cir. 2001), and Ab-Tech Construction, Inc. v. United States, 31 Fed. Cl. 429, 433–34 (Fed. Cl. 1994), aff’d, 57 F.3d
1084 (Fed. Cir. 1995) (unpublished table decision).
21
The result can be generalized. All liability rules are ultimately backed by property
rules. There is no point in pricing failure to pay the price.
22
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1989–90 (footnote omitted).
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self.”23 But they do not define “bad faith breach” of a dualperformance obligation. They say an example would be failing to
transfer “on the impermissible ground that legal costs will deter a
promisee’s lawsuit.”24 On their model, however, a party’s motives
for breaching both the action and transfer terms should be immaterial. Breach of the disjunctive obligation is always inefficient. There
is no reason to permit a do-over with specific performance rather
than simply punish the wrong.
If there is an answer here, I think it is the sense that contract
disputes often result from genuine disagreements among the parties as to just what their contractual rights and obligations are.25
There is no point in imposing punitive damages on a party who
“takes” an entitlement because she honestly believes it does not
exist—who breaches her contract because she is mistaken about
what it requires of her. The threatened penalty has no purchase.
The court’s function in these cases is more to resolve the legal interpretive questions than to protect the entitlement to performance. Only after the parties’ duties have been clarified should their
breach be penalized.
Markovits and Schwartz’s model therefore suggests expectation
damages for parties who breach because they are honestly mistaken about their contractual obligations, and punitive damages for
those who knowingly breach the action term and also fail to pay
the transfer amount. Would courts find it difficult to distinguish
these cases? Perhaps at the margins. But there are also easy cases,
and courts can use familiar tools like burdens of proof, scienter requirements, and the like to get at them.26 While Markovits and
Schwartz minimize the result, their dual-performance hypothesis,
as well as the theory of efficient breach that it builds on, supports a
much larger role for punitive damages than contract law currently
provides.
The above thoughts about specific performance and punitive
damages come largely from within Markovits and Schwartz’s
model. I now want to step outside of it and say a few words about
23

Id. at 1989.
Id. at 1988.
25
A possible explanation for that fact is the self-serving bias. But then cognitive biases of this sort lie outside of Markovits and Schwartz’s model.
26
For more details on this point, see Klass, supra note 17, at 54–60.
24
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their argument that the dual-performance hypothesis answers
moral criticisms of contract law’s preference for expectation damages.
Claims that there is a tension between contract remedies and
morality are not trivial. Anyone who teaches U.S. contract law
knows the distance between students’ untutored moral intuitions
and the remedies that the law provides. I read this to be the point
of Justice Holmes’s infamous statement that “[t]he duty to keep a
contract at common law means a prediction that you must pay
damages if you do not keep it,—and nothing else.”27 The “Holmesian heresy” is best read not as a theoretical account of how to understand contract law, as Markovits and Schwartz would have it. It
is rather advice to future lawyers about how to identify, or predict,
what the law is, which is what their clients will require of them.28
Confusing contract law with the morality of promises causes false
predictions because, most obviously, promises are subject to the
principle of pacta sunt servanda—agreements are to be kept—
while the law does not force parties to keep their contractual
agreements. Especially counterintuitive is the case of the promisor
who breaches to take advantage of a better opportunity, a paradigm for the efficient breach theorist. Promises are meant to exclude from the promisor’s performance decision such considerations of self-interest and profit. Yet the law permits them. Thus the
perceived tension between contract and morality.
Like Markovits and Schwartz, I think the moral critics have it
wrong but for different reasons. Markovits and Schwartz’s argument is one of four possible responses to the moral critics, and not
the best of them.

27

Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457 (1897), reprinted in 110 Harv. L. Rev. 991, 995 (1997).
28
Justice Holmes’s thoughts on how to understand the law can be found in the latter
two-thirds of the article. There Holmes first describes a hermeneutics of suspicion
that reveals the hidden purpose of legal rules (“[w]hen you get the dragon out of his
cave on to the plain and in the daylight, you can count his teeth and claws, and see
just what is his strength,” id. at 469) and then recommends a new, more rational form
of jurisprudence (“the social end which is aimed at by a rule of law is obscured and
only partially attained in consequence of the fact that the rule owes its form to a
gradual historical development, instead of being reshaped as a whole, with conscious
articulate reference to the end in view,” id.). Cf. Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1,
at 1981.
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One answer to the felt tension between contract law and morality is to argue that contract law has nothing to do with the parties’
moral obligations. This thesis is commonly joined with a description of contract law as a pure power-conferring rule.29 Contract
law’s function, on that description, is to enable persons to undertake legal obligations when they choose to do so. The law imposes
obligations on the parties to a contract because they have asked for
them. The legal reasons for enforcement have nothing to do with
the parties’ moral obligations to one another. It is a category mistake to criticize contract law for being at odds with morality.
I will not spend much time on this answer, which is not Markovits and Schwartz’s. I have argued elsewhere that powerconferring theories describe only one side of the contract law we
have. There are good reasons to think that contract law imposes
duties on parties for reasons other than the fact that they have chosen to be legally obligated.30 Nor does the approach answer Seana
Shiffrin’s more subtle claim that no matter what the purpose of
contract law, we do not want its rules to depart too far from the
dictates of morality, lest it degrade our moral culture.31
The second answer, which is the one Markovits and Schwartz
opt for, maintains that the moral critique misunderstands the content of contractual promises.32 The argument here exploits the fact
that promissory obligations are largely content neutral. If a promise has the form
“I promise s,”
29

For examples, see Dori Kimel, From Promise to Contract: Towards a Liberal
Theory of Contract (2003); Randy E. Barnett, Contract is Not Promise; Contract is
Consent, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 7–9, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1792586); Michael G. Pratt, Contract: Not Promise, 35 Fla.
St. U. L. Rev. 801, 801–02 (2008).
30
Gregory Klass, Three Pictures of Contract: Duty, Power and Compound Rule, 83
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1726, 1727–31 (2008).
31
Seana Valentine Shiffrin, The Divergence of Contract and Promise, 120 Harv. L.
Rev. 708, 740–43 (2007).
32
This answer can also be found in, for example, Craswell, supra note 2 (manuscript
at 46–51); Barbara H. Fried, The Holmesian Bad Man Flubs His Entrance, The Limits
of Non-Consequentialism in Contract Theory, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming
2012) (manuscript at 5-7); Avery W. Katz, Virtue Ethics and Efficient Breach, 45 Suffolk U. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 1–3, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1845703); Jody S. Kraus, The Correspondence of Contract
and Promise, 109 Colum. L. Rev. 1603, 1603–08 (2009).
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where s stands for a proposition describing one’s future actions, the
speech act’s moral force lies in the “I promise,” not in s. Promises
are morally binding because of the moral quality of the act of
promising, not because of the moral quality of the act promised.
Content neutrality allows one to grant that the moral critics might
be correct to identify contracts as promises, but to argue that they
misunderstand the content of those promises—they misinterpret s.
The content of the promise includes both the right and the remedy.
As Richard Craswell put the point over twenty years ago, “the
rules governing such topics as remedies and excuses could effectively be treated as just a more complete definition of the exact obligation undertaken by the promisor.”33 Or in Markovits and
Schwartz’s formulation, “the legal remedy is an implied term.”34
Contractual promises are weaker than the moral critics think because the content includes less demanding remedial obligations
than do the promises that the moral critics take as their paradigms.
I will not discuss the merits of this answer. I have already suggested some problems with Markovits and Schwartz’s version of it.
Instead, I want to identify two other ways of answering the moral
critics. Both, I think, better describe the contract law we have and
its relation to the parties’ moral obligations.35
The third possible answer focuses not on the content of parties’
moral obligations, but rather on their source and type. Instead of
proposing a new interpretation of s, this approach questions
whether contracts in fact involve an “I promise . . . .” As Hume observed, “Two men, who pull the oars of a boat, do it by agreement
or convention, tho’ they have never given promises to each
other.”36 By the same token, two parties might agree to an exchange without promising performance—without expressing an intent to undertake a moral obligation by the very expression of that
intent. The absence of a promise does not mean the agreement is
morally inert. Non-promissory exchange agreements can generate

33

Craswell, supra note 11, at 504.
Markovits & Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1953 n.31.
35
I examine both in more detail in Gregory Klass, Promise Etc., 45 Suffolk U. L.
Rev. (forthcoming 2012) (manuscript at 11–14, available at http://ssrn.com/
abstract=1762075).
36
David Hume, Of Morals, in A Treatise of Human Nature 455, 490 (London, Clarenden Press, reprt. 1888).
34
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reliance-based obligations, obligations of trust, obligations of reciprocity, obligations rooted in the parties’ relationship, or some combination of these and other moral reasons to perform. And these
obligations might be weaker than promissory ones—not because
they have a different content but because they are obligations of a
different type. A non-promissory moral duty to perform might not
exclude so many considerations of one’s own interests from the
performance decision. It might require greater flexibility in performance from both sides. And it might impose remedial obligations that differ from a promise-breaker’s second-order moral obligations. If the law of contracts does not fit with promissory
obligations to perform, perhaps it better fits the non-promissory
obligations that attach to agreements for consideration. If so, that
fit is a reason to interpret contract law as concerned less with
promises than with other sorts of agreement-based obligations.
Like Markovits and Schwartz’s dual-performance hypothesis,
this third answer suggests that those who see a tension between
contract and promise have been held captive by a false picture. But
the picture comes from a different place. Markovits and Schwartz
locate the confusion in the fact that parties use sentences of the
form “I shall x,” when in fact they mean “I shall x or y.” I am suggesting that it lies in theorists’ assumption that parties have promised performance, when in fact parties rarely use the words “I
promise . . .” or their equivalent.
A fourth possible response is that moral critics assume too simple a view of the available moral functions of the law. One way of
putting the perceived tension between contract and promise is that
contract requires less of a party than does morality. Morality requires, for example, that the promisor forgo a better opportunity
for the sake of performance, while contract law permits her to
avoid performance for a price. This is a problem, however, only if
we assume that if contract law has a moral function, it must be to
enforce parties’ moral obligations.37 But contract law might have
other sorts of moral functions. Here are two possibilities: First,
contract law might aim to enforce not first-order obligations to per37

“If expectation damages were merely substitutionary, courts that award them
would leave promisees with something other than what they have bargained for, and
hence (perhaps) would undermine contract’s essential purpose.” Markovits &
Schwartz, supra note 1, at 1984.
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form, but second-order obligations that arise upon the breach of
those first-order obligations. There are good reasons in many contexts to leave the performance decision to considerations of reputation, relationship, community norms, and morality. A contract law
that is sensitive to those reasons might attempt not to deter or punish breach, but only to clean up the mess it leaves behind. Such a
contract would serve morality under the heading of corrective justice. Second, and not incompatibly, the purpose of contract law
might involve not enforcing individual parties’ obligations, but fostering a moral culture in which people choose to perform for the
right reasons. Contract law might, for example, have an expressive
function. An award of expectation damages marks the fact that one
party has wronged the other, and thereby supports the social practice of making and keeping agreements.
Either of these alternative accounts of the moral purpose of contract law might recognize that contract remedies also tend to deter
breach, and even see that as a good thing. But neither considers enforcement of the moral obligation to perform the raison d’être of
contract law. The problem with the moral criticism is that it rests
on an oversimplified picture of the possible moral functions of contract law.38
In my view the third and fourth answers better cohere with the
contract law we have than does the dual-performance hypothesis.
That is a much bigger claim than I can defend here, so I will close
with a thought about how it connects with my discussion of punitive damages. I have argued that, from the perspective of Markovits and Schwartz’s model, punitive damages should be available
for a party’s knowing failure to perform or pay. If we look to the
law, however, we find not only a preference for compensatory
measures but also mandatory limits on parties’ ability to contract
for more.39 What explains the gap between the law we have and the
law that Markovits and Schwartz’s model recommends?
38

My argument here might be compared to Richard Craswell’s argument that moral
critics unduly assume that “promises must either (1) oblige the promisor to perform
the promised actions, or (2) have no moral force at all.” Richard Craswell, Two Economic Theories of Enforcing Promises, in The Theory of Contract Law: New Essays
19, 27 (Peter Benson ed., 2001). Where Craswell emphasizes an alternative economic
understanding of legal remedies—as altering incentives rather than imposing and enforcing obligations—I am suggesting alternative moral understandings.
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See Restatement (Second) of Contracts §§ 356, 359(1) (1979).
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One possible answer is that the penalty rule and the rule against
punitive damages are simply misguided. I have argued elsewhere
that courts should permit parties to attach extracompensatory
remedies to the breach of terms designed to enable recovery in the
case of breach, such as an obligation to share information about
performance.40 That suggestion, however, is much more modest
than what I claim to be the implications of Markovits and
Schwartz’s model, which is that punitive damages should be available for any knowing failure to perform or pay. Still, if you adhere
to their model, you might say that the existing preference for compensatory damages is simply wrong.
Markovits and Schwartz have a different answer, which involves
the practical costs of punitive damages. They worry about the possibility of false positives: that courts will impose punitive damages
in cases in which nonperformance was the result of mistake (and
punitive awards can do no good) or even where there was no
breach at all. That’s not a bad answer, though Markovits and
Schwartz need to do more work to make it convincing.
But there is also a third possible answer: Markovits and
Schwartz’s model does not capture everything that is happening in
the law of contracts. Their model leaves no room, for example, for
considerations of corrective justice or for society’s interest in supporting the moral practice of entering into and keeping agreements, both of which might explain why courts do not award punitive damages for first-order breach. Compensatory damages are
the bread and butter of corrective justice; and they support the
practice by sending a message that breach is wrong while reserving
expressions of greater disapprobation (punitive damages) for more
significant wrongs, such as fraud in the inducement. Markovits and
Schwartz’s instrumental model cannot comprehend such moral arguments against punitive damages for first-order breach. Especially
telling, I think, is the fact that the rules against penalties for firstorder breach are not mere defaults, but mandatory limits around
which parties cannot contract. The law gives parties wide latitude
to define their contractual obligations to one another. This is freedom of contract. It does not, however, permit them to contract for
remedies that run contrary to the social purpose of enforcing their
40

Klass, supra note 17, at 11–13.

158

Virginia Law Review

[Vol. 98:143

agreements. The duty to perform is chosen; the duty to pay damages is not. If this is right, it can only cause confusion to interpret
contractual commitments, even between sophisticated parties, as
promises to perform or pay.

